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Taxing Under the
Influence?




University of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky
Khawaja Mamun
Sacred Heart University, Fairfield, Connecticut
This article examines the effect of state level corruption on state beer taxes in the
United States. Our lobby group model predicts that corruption reduces the beer
tax, but this effect is conditional on the level of alcohol-related vehicle deaths.
Using a panel of state level data from 1982 to 2001, we find that increased cor-
ruption is associated with lower state beer tax rates. The magnitude of the effect,
however, declines with increases in alcohol-related traffic deaths. Our findings
suggest that future empirical work estimating the effect of alcohol taxes on
alcohol-related traffic fatalities should treat alcohol taxes as endogenous.
Keywords: alcohol taxes; corruption; political economy; traffic accidents
I. Introduction
One of the main social costs of alcohol consumption is the number of
lives lost to alcohol-related motor vehicle accidents. For example, in year
2004, the total number of alcohol-related traffic deaths was 14,409
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(NHTSA, 2006).1A debate continues in the literature on the effectiveness of
alcohol taxes in reducing the frequency of such deaths in the United States.
According to Kenkel (1993), a 10 percent price increase would reduce the
probability of drinking and driving by 7.4 percent and 8.1 percent for males
and females, respectively; Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2006) find road
fatalities to be negatively affected by alcohol prices, whereas alcohol con-
sumption is positively correlated with fatalities.2,3 Simultaneously, the beer
industry pours considerable funds into the political process determining
beer taxes. For example, in North Carolina, the beer industry spent
US$565,000 in the 2004 state level election.4
Both the federal and the state governments levy alcohol taxes. However,
state alcohol taxes vary tremendously. On January 1, 2006, the median state
beer tax equaled 18.8 cents per gallon, and ranged from 2 cents per gallon in
Wyoming to US$1.07 in Alaska. In this article, we seek to explain why
the beer tax varies so widely among U.S. states. Our particular focus is
state-level differences in corruption.5
The effect of corruption on U.S. public policy outcomes has received
relatively scant attention in the literature; exceptions include Goel and
Nelson (1998) who explore the effect of corruption on government size, and
Glaeser and Saks (2006) who find negative effects of corruption on employ-
ment and income growth.6 In particular, the literature lacks an analysis of
the impact of corruption on state beer taxes (and on other alcohol taxes).
We seek to remedy this deficiency.
Our theoretical model of endogenous alcohol tax policy determination
builds on Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman
(1997). In our model, a state government may reduce alcohol consumption
by raising the beer tax, which in turn affects the incidence of alcohol-related
traffic deaths. However, a lobby representing beer producers opposes higher
beer taxes; it offers the state government a bribe (campaign contribution) in
exchange for lower beer taxes. Thus, we seek to model (high-level) political
corruption rather than bureaucratic (low-level) or overall corruption.7 The state
government values bribes and aggregates social welfare, and their relative
importance is used as a measure of the degree of state government corruption
(following, e.g., Schulze and Ursprung 2001; Fredriksson and Svensson
2003).8 Our theory predicts that an increase in corruption reduces the beer tax,
and the effect is conditional on the incidence of alcohol-related traffic fatalities.
Although other authors have investigated the role of corruption on policymak-
ing, the present article is to our knowledge the first to investigate the interaction
effect of corruption and traffic fatalities on beer (alcohol) taxes using the Gross-
man and Helpman (1994; or Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman 1997) framework.9
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We evaluate the implications of our theory using state level data for
years 1982 to 2001. We use conviction rates of public officials as our cor-
ruption measure (as in Goel and Nelson 1998; Fredriksson, Millimet, and
List 2003; Glaeser and Saks, 2006). The empirical findings support the the-
ory. States with higher levels of corruption set lower beer taxes. Moreover,
the effect is conditional on the frequency of the state’s alcohol-related traf-
fic deaths. In particular, corruption has a smaller negative effect on the beer
tax when this fatality rate is high. Thus, the beer producer lobby has rela-
tively less influence on state governments’ tax rate decisions when the
alcohol-related traffic fatality rate increases.
Our results allow us to estimate a corruption elasticity of the beer tax by
state. The average (unweighted) value of this elasticity in 2001 over all U.S.
states equals 0.24. Our estimates suggest that in Pennsylvania, for exam-
ple, a 1 percent reduction in corruption would lead to 1.02 percent increase
in the beer tax.10
What are the implications of our findings? First, we believe our results
may have implications for future empirical investigations of the effects of
beer (and other alcohol) taxes on alcohol-related traffic fatalities. Many
studies to date have found few robust negative effects of beer taxes on
alcohol-related vehicle fatalities.11 This may be attributable to the fact that
this literature has treated beer taxes as exogenous. If alcohol-related vehicle
fatalities affect beer tax rates, any empirical model seeking to estimate the
effect of beer taxes on such fatalities should take into account that both vari-
ables are endogenous.12,13
Second, our findings suggest that corruption has potentially serious spill-
over effects, which previously have not received attention in the literature.
In fact, it appears lethal. Assuming that state beer taxes affect beer con-
sumption and alcohol-related traffic fatalities (as reported by Young and
Bielinska-Kwapisz 2006 and others), corruption claims lives every year
in the United States by causing lower state beer taxes.14
The article is organized as follows. Section II sets up a theoretical model,
which guides our empirical work. Section III discusses the data and our
empirical approach, and Section IV reports our empirical results. Section
V concludes.
II. Model
In this section, we set up a simple theoretical model that guides our
empirical work. A state is inhabited by a population normalized to unity.
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They are (for simplicity) all consumers of a numeraire good, z, as well as of
alcohol, x.15 The price of the numeraire good is normalized to unity and the
price of alcohol equals p.
All individuals are assumed to (costlessly) drive a fixed distance per
year, normalized to one mile.16 Alcohol consumption is associated with
driving-under-the-influence (DUI) and thus alcohol-related traffic deaths.
Alcohol is taxed by the state government at a rate t. The resulting tax rev-
enue is used to provide a state level public good, M, consumed by the state’s
entire population. We assume that each individual disregards their own con-
sumption’s impact on alcohol-related traffic deaths. Each individual has a
quasi-linear utility function
U ¼ zc þ uðxcÞ þMc  bR; ð1Þ
where zc, xc, and Mc are consumption of the numeraire good, alcohol, and
the public good, respectively, and u is a concave subutility function. b is
an (average) cost-of-accident coefficient, and R is the expected driver
alcohol-related accident involvement rate, which equals the share of
drivers involved in alcohol-related traffic fatalities (per time period). R is
a function of the DUI offense rate, D, and a vector of vehicle-, driver-, and
traffic-safety measures, T, that is, R ¼ RðD; TÞ; where RD > 0;RDD < 0;
RT < 0;RTT > 0; and RDT < 0; following Benson, Rasmussen, and Mast
(1999). DUI offenses are assumed to be a function of aggregate alcohol con-
sumption, Q, and the expected punishment from a DUI offense, E, that is,
D ¼ DðQ;EÞ; where DQ > 0;DQQ < 0;DE < 0; and DEE > 0:17
Every individual is endowed with a unit of labor. The numeraire sector
requires labor input only. Assuming an input-output coefficient equal to one
in the numeraire sector, the wage rate is fixed at unity. Alcohol is assumed
to be produced by symmetric duopoly firms using labor and a sector-
specific factor. Duopoly firm k, k 6¼ i, has an output level equal to qk , and
a cost function given by cðqkÞ, where c0 > 0, and c00 > 0. Industry output
equals qk þ qi ¼ Q: Disregarding all political expenditures (see below), the
profit function of firm k equals
pk ¼ ½pðQÞ  tqk  cðqkÞ; ð2Þ
where PðQÞ  t reflects the market price net of the alcohol tax. We assume
P0 < 0, such that the demand function is negatively sloped, and that
P0þqkP00 < 0, such that a one-shot stable Cournot-Nash equilibrium exists
(see Shapiro 1990). The FOCs equal
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qpk
qqk
¼ P t þ P0qk  c0 ¼ 0; k; i; ; k 6¼ i: ð3Þ
The SOCs require q2pk=qqk
2
< 0; and jq2pk=qqk2 j > jq2pk=ðqqkqqiÞj; k 6¼ i:
Requiring qpk=qqi < 0; k 6¼ i, ensures stability (see Shapiro 1990). In addi-
tion, by symmetry of firm k and i, q2pk=ðqqkqqiÞ¼ q2pi=ðqqiqqkÞ. Totally dif-
























Denote the determinant of this system by jDj; the SOCs imply jDj > 0.
























jDj < 0; ð5:2Þ
where the signs of (5.1) and (5.2) follow from symmetry and the restrictions
on terms from the SOCs. It follows that we can write QðtÞ; where Q0 < 0:
Finally, note that the provision of the public good is determined by the
amount of tax revenues raised, that is, M ¼ Qt:
Lobbying and the Game
We follow much of the lobbying literature and abstract from free-riding
problems discussed by Olson (1965); we assume that an alcohol producer
lobby group is formed (exogenously) in each state and is joined by all indus-
try firms. Each alcohol producing firm contributes equally to the lobby’s
attempt to influence the government’s alcohol tax policy decision (consis-
tent with the assumption that firms are identical). Our focus on one policy
instrument alone is consistent with much of the literature (see Grossman
and Helpman 2001).
The alcohol tax is determined by a two-stage game between the incum-
bent government and the lobby group (see Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman
1997). In the first stage, the firm lobby offers the government a prospective
bribe (political contribution) schedule, CðtÞ; that is, a function that relates
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the size of the bribe to the size of the alcohol tax. In the second stage, the
government selects its optimal tax policy, t*, and receives the bribe associ-
ated with the tax selected. We assume that all promises are kept (i.e., the
lobby group does not renege on its promise in the second stage). Given
t*, firms set their output levels.






The government’s objective function, G(t), is the weighted sum of the
bribe and aggregate social welfare:
GðtÞ ¼ CðtÞ þ aAðtÞ; ð7Þ
where A(t) aggregates consumer surplus, firm profits, labor income, tax
revenues, and the disutility from expected fatalities because of drunk







pkðtÞ þ l þ Qt  bRðD; TÞ: ð8Þ
Finally, the parameter a  0 in equation (7) measures the government’s exo-
genous weight on welfare relative to bribes (campaign contributions). Fol-
lowing Schulze and Ursprung (2001) and Fredriksson and Svensson (2003),
we interpret a as a measure of the degree of government honesty (absence
of corruption). It ranges from close to zero honesty to perfect honesty
ða!1Þ.18
The Political Equilibrium
Because the equilibrium characterization in the common agency game
by Bernheim and Whinston (1986; see also Grossman and Helpman
1994; Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman 1997) is standard in the literature,
we omit the derivation here to conserve space (available on request). It can
be shown that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, ðCðtÞ; tÞ; is impli-
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Taking the partial derivatives of equations (6) and (8), and substituting















Term A in expression (10) reflects the downward pressure on the alcohol tax
because of producer lobbying. Term B mirrors the state government’s wel-
fare considerations such as firm profits, consumer surplus, tax revenues, and
expected DUI offenses, respectively. Because term A is negative, term B
must be positive. This suggests that because of lobbying the alcohol tax
is set suboptimally low (welfare is increasing in the tax rate), and thus the
costs associated with the expected number of DUI offenses are subopti-
mally high (unless the government is purely welfare maximizing,
a!1Þ: Note also that because expression (10) reflects the political equili-
brium characterization, it implicitly depicts the equilibrium tax set because
of lobbying aimed at avoiding an even higher tax. Below, we use a number
of elasticities, ejl; where j; l ¼ R;D;Q; t:













Proof: Rearrangements of equation (10) yield equation (11). Q.E.D.
Expression (11) reveals that the equilibrium tax rate is positive, because
terms A and B in equation (11) are both positive (this follows because term
B in equation (10) must be negative). Thus, a higher equilibrium accident
involvement rate, R, and a higher cost per accident, b, both raise the equili-
brium tax rate, ceteris paribus. Moreover, increases in the (absolute value of
the) tax elasticity of alcohol consumption, eQt; the consumption elasticity of
DUI offenses, eDQ; and the DUI elasticity of accident involvement, eRD; all
raise the equilibrium alcohol tax, ceteris paribus.20
In essence, this is because the greater is the eventual impact of the tax on
accidents, the greater the alcohol tax. It becomes more difficult, ceteris
paribus, for the government to give in to the alcohol lobby’s pressure, the
greater the effect of the tax on accidents. However, the greater is the
absolute value of the quantity elasticity of price,ePQ; the lower is the alcohol
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tax. If a reduction in the quantity sold (because of the tax) raises price
sharply, consumer surplus suffers.
Proposition 2: In equilibrium, corruption reduces the alcohol tax.












where the denominator, H (expression available on request) is the negative
of the SOC of the government’s maximization in equation (10). H is
required to be negative for a maximum, which we assume, and thus the
denominator is positive. From equation (10), the numerator is positive, and
thus (12) is positive. Thus, a reduction in corruption (a higher a) raises the
alcohol tax. Q.E.D.
Although Proposition 2 suggests that corruption lowers the alcohol tax,
Proposition 1 indicates that the effect of corruption also depends on several
variables that influence the accident rate. Note that term A in equation (11)
is multiplied by term B. In particular, the absolute value of the tax elasticity
of alcohol consumption, eQt; the DUI elasticity of accident involvement,
eRD; and the consumption elasticity of DUI offenses, eDQ; all influence how
changes in corruption influence the alcohol tax. These variables are how-
ever endogenously determined, and without resorting to the use of a specific
functional form, a clear-cut direction of the interaction effect of corruptibil-
ity and the frequency of alcohol-related traffic accidents on the alcohol tax
can therefore not be established. We can, however, establish that the effect
of corruption is conditional on the frequency of such accidents. Our empiri-
cal work below aims to clarify the empirical relationship between these
variables.
III. Empirical Approach and Data
Our theoretical framework yields the hypothesis that the effect of corrup-
tion on the alcohol tax rate is negative. Moreover, this impact is conditional
on the costs associated with alcohol-related traffic accidents. In this section,
we attempt to empirically evaluate these implications of the theory. The
following model is estimated:
BEER TAXit ¼ i þ t þ CORRUPTIONitd1 þ FATALITIESitd2þ
CORRUPTIONit  FATALITIESitd3 þ Xitbþ eit;
ð13Þ
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where CORRUPTIONit is a measure of the level of corruption in state i at
time t, FATALITIESit is the number of alcohol-related traffic deaths per
100 million vehicle miles traveled in state i at time t, Xit represents the vec-
tor of controls, i is a time-invariant state fixed effect, and t is the location-
invariant time fixed effects.21 These fixed effects should capture, for example,
differences in religious practices across states and time, which may influence
the determination of beer taxes. We follow much of the related literature on the
effects of corruption in the United States and treat CORRUPTIONit as exogen-
ous (see Fisman and Gatti 2002; Fredriksson, Millimet, and List 2003).
The vector of control variables in our base model includes per capita per-
sonal income and the per capita budget deficit. We expect that higher
income states generate higher income tax receipts and are therefore able
to set lower beer taxes, whereas higher per capita state budget deficits
would induce states to raise beer taxes. The ability and willingness to
change tax rates may also be influenced by the amount of power either polit-
ical party has in the state legislature. We include two dummy variables indi-
cating whether the government is strongly democratic or strongly
republican; this occurs if a particular party controls both legislatures with
a 66 percent majority.22 Reed (2006) suggests that the total tax burden tends
to be larger when democrats run state governments. We also include spirits
consumption per capita for population older than 21 years (lagged one year)
and sale of spirits (lagged one year). States with larger per capita sales of
spirits may require lower beer taxes to reach a given revenue target. A mea-
sure that may affect the amount of DUI is the legal level of intoxication
(BAC ¼ 0.1 or BAC ¼ 0.08), which we include in a few models. Legisla-
tion determining the legal level of intoxication may reflect an overall state
policy toward reducing drunk driving, as discussed by Freeman (2007).
According to our theory, the costs associated with alcohol-related traffic
accidents and state beer tax rates are endogenously determined. Our mea-
sure of the costs of alcohol-related traffic fatalities is FATALITIES
described above. We deal with the endogeneity problem by adopting an
instrumental variable approach. We seek to select an instrument that reflects
risky behavior that may influence traffic fatalities but is independent of fac-
tors that affect the beer tax rate. We instrument alcohol-related deaths with
either one or two instruments, depending on model (tables 1 and 2, respec-
tively). Per Capita Vehicle Miles Traveled (from NHTSA) is included as an
instrument in all models. A greater number of per capita vehicle miles tra-
veled increases the probability of an alcohol-related accident for a given
number of drunk drivers. In addition, using cars (instead of public transpor-
tation) leads to more alcohol-related road deaths, ceteris paribus. A second
Fredriksson et al / Corruption and U.S. State Beer Taxes 347
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set of regressions includes a second instrument, Per Capita Cigarette Rev-
enue from Orzechowski and Walker (2003), which is likely to reflect risky
behavior but not to influence the beer tax. It follows that we must also
instrument for the interaction FATALITIES  CORRUPTION, given that
we instrument for FATALITIES. Thus, as a consequence of using one and
two instruments for FATALITIES in the models reported in tables 1 and 2,
respectively, we are required to use two and four instruments in these mod-
els, respectively. In the next section, we provide a range of tests of the valid-
ity of these instruments.
Data
We use state level data for years 1982 to 2001. Descriptive statistics are
provided in table 3, and all data sources are provided in appendix B. We
denote our dependent variable by BEER TAX. The beer excise tax rate data
come from World Tax Data Base (2006); this data is converted into real
1982 dollars. In year 2001, the nominal tax rate ranged between US$0.02
per gallon in Wyoming and US$0.768 per gallon in South Carolina.
CORRUPTION reflects the level of government corruption and is mea-
sured by the number of convictions of public officials on corruption charges
per 1000 public sector employees. CORRUPTION serves as a proxy for the
inverse of the weight a included in the theory, which measures the govern-
ment’s exogenous weight on welfare relative to bribes. The data come from
reports from the U.S. Department of Justice. These reports provide annual
state-level data on the number of public officials convicted of corruption-
related activities; we use a three-year moving average of this proxy vari-
able. These data have been used also by Goel and Nelson (1998), Fisman
and Gatti (2002), Fredriksson, Millimet, and List (2003), and Glaeser and
Saks (2006). Despite a number of possible caveats, it remains the best avail-
able panel data measure of corruption in the United States, to our knowl-
edge. One caveat is that it includes all forms of corruption convictions,
not only convictions for political corruption.23 In 2001, CORRUPTION
ranged from zero in Maine, Wyoming, and Vermont, to 0.16 in Montana.24
We note that high beer taxes may induce bribery aimed at lower the tax.25
However, with a three-year moving average of corruption (which itself is
lagged by the delay of convictions), the timing of our measure ensures that
corrupt activities occurred before the tax year observation.
Data on the number of alcohol-related traffic deaths per 100 million
vehicle miles traveled (FATALITIES) and vehicle miles traveled come
351
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from NHTSA. In 2001, Utah had the lowest alcohol-related traffic fatality
rate per 100 million miles traveled at 0.30, and South Carolina had the high-
est at 1.25. To smooth out any fluctuations in the fatality rates, we use a
three-year moving average of FATALITIES.
Next, we turn to our set of control variables. Data on state personal incomes
and state budget deficits come from the Bureau of Economics Analysis and
the Statistical Abstract of United States, respectively. To control for political
party dominance, we use two dummy variables that measure republican and
democratic party strength in state government.26 The dummy is equal to one
if a party has a 66 percent majority in both the state House and the state Senate.
Using a 66 percent majority allows for veto overrides. The proportions of
democrats and republicans in the Senate and House in each state are calculated
from various editions of the Statistical Abstract of the United States. The spir-
its consumption data comes from National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and
Alcoholism (NIAAA 2004). Data on legislation determining maximum blood
alcohol content levels (BAC; i.e., the legal level of intoxication) comes from
Freeman (2007). All data sources are listed in appendix B.
IV. Empirical Results
Table 1 reports our main results, and table 2 provides a robustness anal-
ysis. All models include state and time fixed effects.27 Several diagnostic
tests are conducted to assess the reliability and the efficiency of the IV esti-
mations. First, we use the Pagan and Hall (1983) test of heteroskedasticity
of the errors. Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2003) showed that standard IV
estimation is more reliable than the GMM approach in finite samples if the
errors are homoskedastic. Second, we present the results of Hansen’s J sta-
tistic. This is an over-identification test for the validity of the instruments
for models with the number of instruments exceeding the number of endo-
genous regressors. Third, we report the F test of joint significance of the
instruments in each first-stage regression (see Staiger and Stock 1997).
Fourth, we report Shea’s (1997) partial R2. It is well known that when mul-
tiple endogenous regressors are used, the F statistics and partial R2 mea-
sures from the first-stage regressions will not reveal weakness of the
instruments. Shea’s (1997) partial R2 measure takes into account the inter-
correlations among the instruments.28 Fifth, we present two under-
identification tests, namely the Kleibergen-Paap LM and Wald tests (Klei-
bergen and Paap 2006). The test of under-identification is a test of whether
the equation is identified. Sixth, we perform a weak identification test by
354 Public Finance Review
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reporting Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic (Kleibergen and Paap 2006).
The F statistic should be compared with the critical values for the
Cragg-Donald weak id test (Cragg and Donald 1993).29 We also include
two statistic that provide weak-instrument-robust inference for testing the
significance of the endogenous regressors in the structural equation being
estimated. The first statistic is the Anderson-Rubin test whether the endo-
genous variables are jointly statistically significant (Anderson and Rubin
1949). The second is the (closely) related Stock and Wright (2000) LM test.
The null hypothesis tested in both cases is that the coefficients of the endo-
genous regressors in the structural equation are jointly equal to zero, and, in
addition, that the over-identifying restrictions are valid. Both tests are
robust to the presence of weak instruments. Finally, we present the average
variance inflation factor (VIF) for each model. As a rule of thumb, a VIF
value greater than 10 may merit further investigation to find whether multi-
collinearity exists (Marquardt 1970).30
Our results hold up to the full battery of diagnostic tests, and this is con-
sistent across models in tables 1 and 2. The Pagan and Hall (1983) tests fail
to reject the null of homoskedasticity in all specifications, indicating relia-
bility of the standard IV method. Hansen’s J statistic is reported in the last
two models of table 1 and passes the Hansen’s over-identification test.31
Furthermore, in all models reported in tables 1 and 2, the F test shows joint
significance for the instruments. Moreover, Shea’s R2 is in the range 0.06 to
0.32 and passes the instrument relevance test. In addition, the Kleibergen-
Paap LM and Wald tests reject the null hypothesis that the equation is
underidentified in all models of tables 1 and 2. Also, the Kleibergen-Paap
Wald F statistic always passes the weak identification Craig-Donald critical
values calculated by Stock and Yogo (2005). Finally, the Anderson-Rubin
Wald and Stock-Wright LM tests easily reject the joint significance of
endogenous regressors (i.e., weak instrument tests) in all models in tables
1 and 2. Finally, all models have an average VIF score well below 10.
In table 1, models I and II present IV-2SLS results with 2 IVs, whereas
Models III and IV report IV-2SLS results using 4 IVs. Models II and IV
include BAC legislation data in addition to the base models. The results
reported in table 1 appear to tell a story consistent with our theory. Although
corruption lowers the level of state beer taxes, the effect is conditional on
the incidence of alcohol-related vehicle accident deaths. In particular, the
negative impact of CORRUPTION on BEER TAX becomes smaller (in
absolute value) as FATALITIES rises. Both the direct effects of CORRUP-
TION, as well as its interaction with FATALITIES, are significant at con-
ventional levels in all models.32 Thus, the beer lobby has a more difficult
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time influencing beer tax policy when alcohol-related traffic fatalities are
more frequent.33 To our knowledge, this finding has not previously been
shown in the literature.
The (unreported but available on request) control variables largely exhi-
bit coefficients consistent with expectations. Moreover, the magnitudes and
signs are insensitive to the inclusion of additional control variables and
instruments. A higher per capita personal income has a negative effect on
BEER TAX. Consistent with Reed’s (2006) study of the total tax burden,
states with democrats in control of the legislature set a higher BEER TAX.
States with a legal BAC level of 0.10 have higher BEER TAX levels.
Robustness Analysis
Table 2 presents a robustness analysis using model I from table 1 with 2
IVs. Model I uses alternative beer tax data from Dave and Kaestner (2002)
for years 1982-1999. This evaluates whether our choice of data source
drives our results (although the shorter time period may hinder the analysis
somewhat). Model II seeks to adjust for possible strategic interaction in pol-
icy making among states (see, e.g., Hunter and Nelson 1992; Nelson 2002;
Brueckner 2003 provides a useful survey of the literature on horizontal tax
externalities). We follow Fredriksson and Mamun (2008) using the
population-weighted tax (denoted NEIGHBOR TAX in Table 2) set by the
neighboring states (instrumented by the population-weighted state unem-
ployment rate, the percentage of children and old in the population). Model
III includes data from the forty-six states that changed the nominal beer tax
during 1980-2001.34 However, we note that it is not inconsistent with the
focus on corruption that no nominal change takes place (in particular, if spe-
cial interests have a sufficiently large influence). In model IV, we use data
only from states that pass an individual Granger causality test (at the 1
percent level), suggesting that CORRUPTION Granger causes BEER TAX
(rather than the causality primarily going in the opposite direction) (Granger
1969). This resulted in 13 states being dropped. Moreover, we also estimated
models with a one-year lag of the moving average of CORRUPTION in
model V. The data set expands to 1982-2002 in this model, as a consequence.
The relevant coefficients are significant in all models except model I,
where the sample ends in 1999. In addition, the negative impact of CORRUP-
TION on BEER TAX becomes smaller (in absolute value) as FATALITIES
rises. The model I results are perhaps because of fewer observations and less
variation in the data. Close observation of the 2000-2001 data reveals a higher
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degree of variation in the data in 2000-2001 relative to the rest of the time
period of study.35 In conclusion, our results appear reasonably robust.
Implications and Discussion
In this section, we discuss the implications of our findings. First, we
examine the effect of corruption on the beer tax. Using model I in table 1, the
marginal effect of corruption on the real beer tax equals 1.36 þ 1.27 
FATALITIES. At the means of all variables, using the full sample, the mar-
ginal effect of corruption equals 0.08. The marginal effect of corruption is
greater when alcohol-related traffic fatalities are less common. In particular,
at one standard deviation (¼0.45) below the mean of FATALITIES, the
marginal effect is 0.79. These results suggest that in states with low
alcohol-related traffic death rates, the corruption yields lower beer tax rates.
However, as the fatality rate increases, the impact of corruption is muted.
Next, we calculate a corruption elasticity of the real beer tax at the state
level (by multiplying the marginal effect by CORRUPTION/BEER TAX).
Appendix A shows the corruption elasticity of the beer tax across states for
2001. These values show great variation, with Pennsylvania and Kentucky
having large (in absolute value) negative elasticities (1.02), suggesting
different potential results of corruption reform across states. The mean elas-
ticity for the states is 0.24, and the median equals 0.16.
Is corruption lethal? To the extent that corruption reduces alcohol taxes
and higher alcohol taxes reduce alcohol-related traffic deaths, corruption
kills. In the literature, an ongoing debate exists regarding the effects of beer
taxes on both beer consumption and alcohol-related vehicle fatalities.
Pacula (1998) finds that a doubling of the beer tax would reduce youth alco-
hol consumption by between 3 percent and 6 percent.36 However, other
studies find that the effect of the alcohol taxes on alcohol consumption is
small (Gius 2005) or that there is no effect of alcohol prices on motor vehi-
cle accidents (Whetten-Goldstein et al. 2000; Cohen, Mason, and Scribner
2001). In our view, one possible problem with the estimates reported in the
literature is the failure to endogenize the alcohol tax.37
V. Conclusion
This article shows that beer producers are more successful in their polit-
ical activities in states where corruption is more widespread. Moreover, this
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effect of corruption is conditional on the rate of alcohol-related traffic fatal-
ities. In particular, the effect of corruption on the beer tax rate is less neg-
ative where these traffic fatalities are more frequent. We believe this is the
first evidence of this nature in the literature.
Our results also raise some possible questions regarding the previous
empirical literature, which seeks to estimate the effect of beer taxes on
alcohol-related traffic fatalities. This literature has omitted the possibility
that beer taxes are endogenously determined. In particular, it has not incor-
porated the effects of corruption and alcohol-related traffic fatalities on beer
taxes. Our analysis may therefore provide some guidance for future empiri-
cal undertakings in this area.
Appendix A
Table A1
Corruption Elasticity of the Beer Tax by State (Year 2001)
State Elasticity State Elasticity
Pennsylvania 1.02 Vermont 0.15
Kentucky 1.02 Oregon 0.14
Rhode Island 0.77 New Hampshire 0.13
Illinois 0.70 Kansas 0.12
New Jersey 0.58 Florida 0.12
North Dakota 0.53 Washington 0.12
New York 0.53 Maine 0.11
Delaware 0.51 Alabama 0.10
Wisconsin 0.45 Utah 0.09
Ohio 0.44 West Virginia 0.09
Colorado 0.40 Oklahoma 0.09
Missouri 0.31 Texas 0.09
Massachusetts 0.31 Georgia 0.08
Nevada 0.30 Mississippi 0.07
Idaho 0.25 Arkansas 0.06
Indiana 0.24 North Carolina 0.04
Virginia 0.23 Iowa 0.03
Connecticut 0.23 Arizona 0.02
Maryland 0.22 South Dakota 0.02
Tennessee 0.21 Louisiana 0.01
Wyoming 0.19 New Mexico 0.01
(continued)
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Table A1. (continued)
State Elasticity State Elasticity
Michigan 0.19 Nebraska 0.01
California 0.19 South Carolina 0.01





BEER TAX World Tax Data Base (2006); http://www.bus.
umich.edu/OTPR/otpr/introduction.htm
CORRUPTION U.S. Department of Justice (various years);
www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pin/
AnnReport_04.pdf
FATALITIES; Vehicle miles traveled NHTSA (various years); http://www-
nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov
Per capita cigarette revenue (US$1000s) Orzechowski and Walker (2003)
Per capita personal income; Per capita
budget deficit (US$1000s); republican
strong; democrats strong
Statistical abstract of the United States; http://
www.census.gov/compendia/statab/
past_years.html
Gallons of Spirits1 NIAAA (2004); http://www.niaaa.nih.gov/
publications/surveillance66/pcyr1970-
2003.txt
Legal intoxication (BAC ¼ .10);
legal intoxication (BAC ¼ .08)
Freeman (2007)
Notes
1. Alcohol-related traffic deaths are deaths where at least one driver or nonoccupant
(pedestrian or bicyclist) involved in the accident had a BAC over 0.08 grams per deciliter. For
drivers aged 16 to 24 years, the number of alcohol-related traffic deaths with BAC greater than
0.01 gram per deciliter was 4,121 (NHTSA 2006; the stricter alcohol limit is used for youths
under the minimum legal drinking age).
2. The impact of a 10-percent price increase on drunk driving of male and female under-
age drinkers would be 12.6 percent and 21.1 percent, respectively (Kenkel 1993; see also Cha-
loupka, Grossman, and Saffer 1993; Grossman et al. 1994). Levitt and Porter (2001) find that
legally drunk drivers pose a risk 13 times greater than other drivers (see also Kenkel 1996).
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3. Motor vehicle accidents are the leading cause of deaths among 6 to 27 year olds in
America, and result in approximately 40,000 deaths per year. According to Grossman et al.
(1994), had the 1991 increase in the federal beer tax from 16 cents to 32 cents per six-pack
been enacted nine years earlier at least 611 young people’s lives would have been saved from
alcohol-related deadly traffic accidents.
4. The main issue was a proposed tax hike on beer supported by state Senate leaders, but
which the beer industry has repeatedly defeated (see http://www.democracy-nc.org/moneyre-
search/2005/rptcrd.html, accessed April 11, 2008).
5. By studying the effect of corruption on state beer taxes, we may potentially also gain an
understanding of its (indirect) impact on alcohol-related traffic deaths.
6. See, for example, Jain (2001) and Aidt (2003) for surveys of the literature on corruption.
7. For discussions of bureaucratic, political, and overall corruption, see, for example,
Rose-Ackerman (1978, 1999) and Ehrlich and Lui (1999).
8. Coate and Morris (1999), who build on Grossman and Helpman (1994), also view a
firm’s political gift as a bribe. Rose-Ackerman (1978) discusses several forms of high-and
low-level corruption, one of which is the legal or illegal use of campaign contributions.
9. Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) study the interaction effects of corruption and polit-
ical instability on environmental policy using the Grossman and Helpman (1994) theoretical
framework, and test the predictions using cross-country data.
10. Appendix A reports estimates of the corruption elasticity of the beer tax for all states.
11. See, for example, Mast, Benson, and Rasmussen (1999) and Young and Likens (2000).
12. See, for example, Levitt (1997) and Besley and Case (2000) for studies examining
endogenous policy changes and the biases in the estimated effect of the policy intervention
when the endogeneity is ignored.
13. While the previous literature has not connected corruption, alcohol-related traffic fatal-
ities, and beer taxes, Brown, Jewell, and Richer (1996) accounted for the endogeneity of alco-
hol prohibition policies (wet/dry status) at the county level. When the policy was endogenously
determined, the estimated effect of a county being wet on alcohol-related traffic deaths was
four times larger relative to when the policy was not treated as endogenous. Kubik and Moran
(2003) find that fixed effects models that estimate the elasticity of demand for beer and cigar-
ettes have large biases when policy endogeneity is ignored. Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz
(2006) use alcohol taxes as instrumental variables and find that alcohol-related traffic fatalities
are negatively affected by alcohol prices; they also report that alcohol consumption is strongly
positively related to traffic fatalities.
14. Estimating the size of the corruption elasticity on alcohol-related traffic deaths is an
interesting topic for future research, but beyond the scope of this article.
15. We believe our model does not only apply to beer (our empirical focus), and thus we
opt keep the wording more general (i.e., ‘‘alcohol’’).
16. The effect of alcohol taxes on driving behavior is not the focus of this paper, and we
therefore hold mileage driven constant.
17. With the population normalized to unity, Q is equivalent to per-capita alcohol
consumption.
18. Schulze and Ursprung (2001) argue that ‘‘the portrayed interaction between the orga-
nized interest groups and the government meets the circumstances of corruption’’ (p. 68). This
is consistent with Shleifer and Vishny’s (1993, p. 599) view of corruption as ‘‘the sale by gov-
ernment officials of government property for personal gain,’’ where government property
refers to government policies.
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19. The derivation is available from the authors upon request.
20. Using meta analysis, Gallet (2007) report a price elasticity of beer demand equal to
0.83 for year 1992.
21. We estimated both a fixed effects and a random effects model. The estimates for these
models were similar. We present the fixed effect results because this estimation procedure
allows us to estimate robust standard errors.
22. Nebraska is unicameral; these dummies indicate whether the government is strongly
democratic or strongly republican in this single legislature.
23. Fredriksson, Millimet, and List (2003) noted several additional potential problems with
this measure of corruption. First, convictions are only recorded if the corrupt bureaucrats are
caught. Second, the data treat all corruption convictions homogenously, independent of the
severity of the crime. Third, the date of convictions does not provide the actual timing of the
corrupt activity.
24. Boylan and Long (2003) surveyed 293 state house reporters in 1999 to measure corrup-
tion within the states. The correlation between their survey-based measure and a 3-year aver-
age (1998-2000) of our measure is 0.39 (significant at the 1 percent level).
25. Goel and Nelson (1998) found that government size, in particular spending by state
governments, has a positive influence on corruption.
26. Nelson (2000) reports that during years 1946-1993, 30.4 percent (18.4 percent) of all
increases in alcohol taxes occurred when both the state governor and the majority of the state
legislature were democratic (republican).
27. We also estimated a model that included a continuous time variable. The results were
indistinguishable from those reported in tables 1 and 2.
28. See Godfrey (1999) for a detailed discussion.
29. See Stock and Yogo (2005) for detailed discussion of the Craig-Donald critical values.
30. Individual VIF scores are available upon request.
31. Hansen’s J statistic is not reported in the first two models of table 1 or in table 2, since
only one instrument is included and the models are exactly identified.
32. Since convictions are often handed down several years after the actual corrupt activities
occurred, we also used the number of convictions in year t þ 1 as an alternative proxy for corrup-
tion in year t, following Fredriksson, Millimet, and List (2003). This yielded results comparable to
those reported in tables 1 and 2. We also used a one-year lag of FATALITIES; the results are sim-
ilar to the ones reported in tables 1 and 2, but the relevant coefficients exhibit a lower level of sig-
nificance (and the IVs become weaker in some models). This may perhaps indicate that the state
legislatures take several years of road fatality data into consideration in their decision making.
33. We also used Cigarette Revenues Per Capita as a single instrument. Although the
results are similar to the ones reported in tables 1 and 2, the coefficient on FATALITIES is
always insignificant. In addition, we replaced FATALITIES with total alcohol-related traffic
fatalities. The results are very similar to the results in table 1 for alcohol-related fatalities per
100 million vehicle miles traveled. However, instruments fail to hold up to the weakness tests.
Other instruments, including motorcycle registrations and teen pregnancies per capita, resulted
in insignificant coefficients on FATALITIES.
34. We used two extra years to account for the tendency to change taxes (in the sense that
we are interested in those states which did change the nominal tax rate, or had a tendency to
change it). Maryland and Missouri were dropped in these models.
35. The SD of BEER TAX was 0.009 in 2000-2001, compared to 0.004 during 1982-1999;
the SD of CORRUPT was 0.003 in 2000-2001, compared to 0.001 during 1982-1999.
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36. See also, for example, Chaloupka, Grossman, and Saffer (1993).
37. See, for example, Trefler (1993) for a discussion of this issue (applied to import tariffs).
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